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  “Crossing the river by touching stones” 
Deng Xiaoping, speaking of the reform policy 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes the history of the Petrochemical industry in China after the Second 
World War. Analysis of the political foundations for the regulatory policies that shaped the 
industry is followed by a detailed review of the role and responsibilities of various  
government bodies in the decision making process. The paper refers to the three fundamental 
political decisions in China, related to the political system, the macroeconomic policy, and 
the crude oil prices. A critical analysis of the price reforms in the 90’s, and the alterations in 
the corporate structure and the distribution system, leads to conclusions on the effectiveness 
of regulatory policies at different stages of planned industrial development. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The petrochemical industry is one of most important fundamental industries in the Chinese 
economy. In the latest Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) the petrochemical industry is placed at the 
heart of China’s economic development program (Ren Min Bao, 1996). The main questions, 
addressed in this paper are: What were the main factors that have determined the evolution of 
China’s petrochemical industry? What was the role played by the Government in promoting 
the industrial development of this sector? 
 
We discuss the history of the petrochemical industry, and examine the current problems and 
constraints for its development under the central planning system. We also examine the 
relationship between the Government and the industry, including formulation and 
implementation of Government policies. The emphasis is put on the fact that future 
development can only be fully understood when placed in the historical context of the 
economic reforms in China. 
 
We look at the Government’s direct and indirect interventions, and their effect on 
investments and enterprises performance. The direct Government intervention in the 
industrial development is conducted through the State Investment Plan. The indirect 
regulation is conducted through implementation of industrial policies, management of 
incentives to firms, relative pricing, and the administrative marketing and distribution 
introduced to the sector with the establishment of the state corporation SINOPEC.  
 
We also discuss the policy problems under the central planning system, and analyze the 
current situation of the petrochemical industry. 
 
The study is based on both primary and secondary data. The collection of primary data 
                                                          
1 In the proceedings of Asia-Pacific Research in Organisation Studies Annual Conference (APROS 2000), 14-16 
December 2000, Sidney, Australia.  
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includes face-to-face interviews with executives from the industry. The interviews in China 
were conducted with officials from the Ministry of Chemical Industry, the president of 
SINOPEC Sheng Huaren, and several top government consultant agencies. The interviews in 
the UK were conducted at a petrochemical conference with chief executives and strategists of 
large petrochemical companies.2 
 
2. The Nature of the Petrochemical Industry  
 
There are significant difficulties to define the boundaries of the petrochemical industry 
because of the complexity of its operations, and the diversity of its products. So far, the 
broadest definition of the industry is in terms of its raw material basis. Thus petrochemicals 
are those chemicals that are manufactured from feedstock, and are obtained from oil or 
natural gas. 
 
The complexity of the petrochemical industry is illustrated by the fact that, the definition 
covers products as varied as basic petrochemicals; intermediate products (manufactured by 
combining basic products, and/or by making these to react with other chemical compounds); 
and finished products. The precise terminology of finished products varies from one set of 
national statistics to another, but petrochemicals generally include plastics, resins, synthetic 
fibers and organic chemicals. 
 
The operation of the industry typically involves linked and sequential processes. The 
manufacture of basic petrochemicals is the first stage in the conversion. Generally speaking, 
basic petrochemicals and intermediates are associated with transactions that are internal to the 
industry, whilst finished petrochemical products usually are integral parts of other industrial 
sectors. 
 
Even though the range of products is vast, the total volume of output is dominated by 
relatively few of them. Well over half of the total output by weight of the world 
petrochemical industry is in the form of plastics and resins, and this broad group together 
with synthetic fibers and synthetic rubbers accounts for more than three-quarters. 
 
The petrochemical industry embraces numerous activities with highly complex inter-
relationships. Figure 1. represents the boundaries of the petrochemical industry, and the 
relationships that it maintains with the other sectors of the economy. At the upstream end, it 
obtains its feedstock from the natural gas and oil refining industries. However, the distinction 
between the petrochemical industry and the other sectors at the downstream end of the 
processing chain is not always clear. 
  
At the upstream end, petrochemical activities are often integrated with oil refining at one 
production site, and the conditions for the petrochemical production are directly influenced 
by the optimization policy for the manufacturing complex as a whole. The vertical integration 
therefore includes refining operations and basic petrochemical production. As a result of that, 
a large share of the trade between the two sectors is a captive trade, influenced in various 
ways by the overall strategy of the manufacturing complex. Therefore, the term 
petrochemical industry in our study includes the refining sector as well. 
                                                          
2 Bryan Sanderson - Chief Executive of BP Chemicals, Ian Bird - Vice President of Government Affairs Waste 
Management International Services Ltd., Charles Stewart - Executive Vice President of Occidental Chemical 
Corporation, and Andrew Buttler - Director of Dow Europe. 
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Figure 1. The Petrochemical Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Shell International Chemical Co. 
 
 
3. The History Of The Petrochemical Industry in China and Patterns of 
Industrial Development and Government Policy Implementation 
 
* The Self-Reliant Policy and Industrial Development 1950s-1970s  
 
The principles underlying China’s policies during Mao’s leadership included Independence 
and self-reliance; equality and mutual benefits; supplying each other’s needs. These were the 
fundamentals in most political decisions from the Maoist period, when the foundations of the 
Chinese economy were built. The petrochemical industry was established in the early 60s. 
Most of the equipment was bought from the Soviet Union, and consisted of onshore oil well-
drilling equipment. These technological purchases accounted for 70% of the total imports in 
1955, 71% in 1956, and 88% in 1957.  After this period, the import of drilling machines 
declined steadily: 49% in 1958, 35% in 1958, and 29% in 1960. By 1960 China was able to 
provide most of its own drilling machines for onshore exploration, and the most important 
items for an import became oil refinery plants.  
FEEDSTOCKS:
Oil fractions, Natural gas
BASIC PETROCHEMICALS:
Olefins and aromatics
MAIN PRODUCT GROUPS:
Industrial chemicals
Plastics and resins
Synthetic rubbers
Synthetic fibres
CHEM ICAL PROCESS INDUSTRIES:
Rubber and plastics, fibres, paints, detergents,
dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, agrochemical,
adhesives, etc.
THE PETROCHEMICAL
INDUSTRY
CHEM ICAL
INDUSTRY
sold petrochemicals
purchased chemicals
chemical conversion
GOODS FOR CONSUMERS:
Food, clothing, housing, health,
transports, etc.
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automobile, paper, food
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During the 60’s and 70s, China changed its choice of partners and started importing plants, 
equipment, and technology from the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Italy, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. During this period, more positive relations were developed 
with Japan, and after 1970 Japan became the major foreign supplier of plants and technology 
for the petrochemical industry in China.  
 
From the changing pattern of equipment procurement, which was totally planned and 
controlled by the central Government, it would appear that the long term objective for the 
Chinese petroleum industry was not to export crude oil in huge quantities, as the OPEC 
countries have tended to do in the past, but rather to expand China’s petrochemical industry. 
As a result of that the petrochemical industry in China became one of the most significant 
industries during the 1980s. 
 
Unfortunately, there was little geographical planning by the Government in order to choose 
the location of these plants, and that resulted subsequently in high transportation costs and in 
difficulties to control the industry. 
 
* The Acquisition of Foreign Technology During the 70’s 
 
The purchase of petrochemical plants became a major import item for China during the 
1960’s and 1970’s. The Italian State Petroleum Company - Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), 
supplied the first set of oil refining equipment from Western Europe. A contract between 
Italy and China was signed in Beijing in December 1963 for an integrated refining plant with 
an annual capacity of 300,000 tons, at a cost of $8.9 million (US dollars). In the following 
year China signed another contract for two more plants at the cost of $14.2 million (US 
dollars) (see Table 1.). 
 
In the same year, France sold to China two plants at a price of $7.2 million (US dollars). The 
Netherlands supplied three plants for $10.5 million (US dollars), and Norway provided a 
naphtha refinery for $14 million (US dollars). In July 1964 West Germany sold to China an 
integrated plant for heavy oil-cracking and olefin separation, at a price of $12.5 million (US 
dollars), followed in 1964-65 by two other plants at the total cost of $12.5 million (US 
dollars) (see Table 1).  
 
In 1963, China prepared a contract with the Kurashiki Rayon Company of Japan to supply an 
integrated vinyl plant. The contract for the $20 million (US dollars) plant was signed but not 
executed because the Japanese Government refused to grant the required export credits to the 
Japanese company.  
 
Prior to 1972, the government-financed Japan Export-Import Bank denied all credits for trade 
with China. The large-scale acquisition of Japanese equipment occurred primarily after 1970. 
The Japanese government policy toward trade with China changed dramatically in 1972, and 
subsequently it offered to China long-term credits at low interest rates. As a consequence, 
exports of petrochemical plants from Japan to China experienced a tremendous increase 
between 1972-73. Overall 14 contracts were awarded to Japanese firms with an aggregate 
value of over $400 million (US dollars) (see Table 1.). 
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Table 1.  Imports of Petrochemical Plants from the West and Japan, 1963-19743 
 
 Value Date Contract 
                Firm (Million US dollars)  was signed 
 
Japan 
 Tokyo Engineer Chemical 46 December 1972 
 Mitsuibishi Yuka and Heavy Industries. 34 February 1973 
 Asahi Kasei 30 March 1973 
 Kuraray Industries 26 March 1973 
 Mitsui Toatsu 42 April 1973 
 Toray and Mitsui Shipbuilding 50 May 1973 
 Sumitomo Chemical 5 May 1973 
 Mitsuibishi Petrochemical 22 July 1973 
 Sumitomo Chemical 41 August 1973 
 Mitsui Toatsu Chemical and Toyo 
      Engineering 43 September 1973 
 Mitsui Petrochemical and Mitsui 
      Shipbuilding and engineering 25 October 1973 
 Nisso Petrochemical 15 December 1973 
 Toho Titanium 5 January 1974 
 Kuraray 19 February 1974 
United States 
 M.W. Kellogg 73 March 1973 
 M.W. Kellogg 130 November 1973 
United Kingdom 
 Humphery and Glasgow 8.4 October 1963 
 Simon Carves 12.6 September 1964 
 Vickers Zwimmer 7 March 1965 
 Humphery and Glasgow 23.8 August 1965 
 Prine 8.4 September 1965 
Former West Germany 
 Friedrich Unde Gmb H.  1.75 July 1964 
 Lurgi-Gasellschaft 11 May 1965 
 Uhde 19 January 1974 
 Uhde 15 March 1974 
Italy 
 Monticattini 14.2 December 1963 
 Snam Projetti 5.55 1966 
 Snam Projetti 16 January 1974 
France 
 Speichem 90 May 1973 
 Technip and Speichem 282 September 
 Huertey Industries 120 February 1974 
Netherlands 
 Kellogg Continental 34 February 1973 
 Kellogg Continental 55 September 1973 
 
 
In September 1973, the largest and most impressive single contract was granted to a French 
consortium at the value of $300 million (US dollars). The entire project involved 17 plants. 
From the perspective of US trade, the most significant development in 1973 was the order by 
the Chinese Government to M.W. Kellogg, a division of Pullman, Inc., for eight ammonia 
plants at the value of $205 million (US dollars) (see Table 1). 
 
The imports of petrochemical plants together with the advanced technologies, peaked in 1973 
when more than 1 billion (US dollars) worth of petrochemical plants were contracted. The 
                                                          
3 Sources:Japan External Trade Promotion Organisation, China News Letter. March 1974, Tokyo; Japan 
Times (various issues), Tokyo; People’s Republic of China International Trade Handbook, Central Intelligence 
Agency, September 1974, pp. 16-17; US China Business Review, January -February 1974; Yearbook on Chinese 
Communism, (1973) Institute for the study of Chinese Communist Problems, Taipei, pp. 56-58. 
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extensive procurement of foreign equipment for the petrochemical industry corresponded 
with the concerted efforts by the Chinese officials to accelerate the acquisition of the latest 
technology from the West and Japan. The petrochemical industry is a capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive industry. In order to avoid foreign participation in the industry, China 
started to purchased equipment and technology, and the foreign currency for these purchases 
was earned from selling crude oil.  
 
Since 1972 Chinese technical delegations have been dispatched to tour the principal oil-
producing nations in the West in order to study their experiences in petroleum and 
petrochemical production. The countries visited for evaluation of equipment manufacturers 
and negotiations included Iran (1972), Canada (1972), France (1973), the UK (1973) and 
Japan (1973). Foreign experts were also invited to China, including state officials from Iraq 
(1971). Between 1972 and 1974, almost all major trade partners in Western Europe held 
industrial exhibitions in Beijing - overall 32 exhibitions. The Chinese Government mobilized 
technicians and college students to obtain detailed drawings of the machinery on display as 
well as to engage in scientific exchanges with the representatives of the major corporations. 
(Heymann, 1975). 
 
However, the most direct way in which China acquired foreign technology was by making 
the training a part of the equipment contracts. With respect to integrated plant purchase 
agreements, arrangements for the training of technicians were made in a five-year exchange 
of know-how, as well as training for Chinese engineers in the equipment-producing countries. 
In some contracts with Japan and with M. W. Kellogg 20% of the contract value was allocated 
for technical services (China Newsletter, March, 1974). 
 
The changes in trade orientation were partly a result of the changing domestic demands, but 
also they were dictated by the changes in international relations. In the early post-war years, 
the Soviet Union was the sole source of supply. In the 1960s, when China was at odds with 
both USSR and United States, the European Common Market and Japan became the natural 
alternatives. The movement towards normalization of the relationships between China and 
the United States in the 1970s has helped to promote US exports to China. In 1971 China 
became a full member of the United Nations. In 1972, the US President Richard Nixon made 
his historic visit to China. At the same time, the diplomatic relationship between China and 
Japan was normalized.  
 
Another important aspect of the structure of imports during the 70’s is the change of China’s 
foreign trade policy, particularly related to intergovernmental credits and payments. During 
the 1950’s China adhered to the principle of balanced trade and declined to accept credits 
offered by non-communist countries. The ability to import was therefore directly constrained 
by China’s ability to export in a given year. Since 1949 China has managed to maintain a 
trade surplus, except during the 1951-55 period when China accepted Soviet Union credit to 
finance her trade deficit.  
 
In August 1972, in a discussion with a Japanese representative, the Chinese Prime Minister 
Zhou En Lai stated that the Government would welcome exports based on international 
payments standards, which included the concept of deferred payments for imports. From 
1973, most export credits granted by Japan were at an annual interest rate of 6%, with a 
repayment period of about five years. The acceptance of deferred payments has considerably 
enlarged China’s ability to import. The large-scale procurement of integrated petrochemical 
plants in 1973 reflected this policy orientation and provided a pattern for the later trade 
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relations. 
 
The parallel co-existence of state investment in technology imports, and yet retaining the 
same managerial and labor practices, the same administrative, financial and economic 
organization that was developed over thirty years of Central Planning, gave roots to problems 
related to the full utilization of the value of imports. Labor productivity in the industry during 
the late 1970’s and 1980’s remained stagnant as the system of lifetime employment provided 
no benefits for surpassing production targets, or for improving efficiency. Decision-making 
remained centralized and directives were sent down from higher authorities. The expensive 
imported refining and petrochemical plants continued during the late 70’s and 80’s to burn 
surplus petroleum products rather than to sell them, due to the fact that the horizontal 
linkages to other potential consumers were not in place. 
 
* Transition During the 1980s 
 
At the end of the 70s, Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Open Door’ policy was a turning point and affected 
virtually every sector of the Chinese economy. In December 1978, the Sixth Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party overturned the Maoist line of development and started the so 
called ‘Open Door’ policy. One evident characteristic of the Open Door policy was the 
implicit recognition that the imports of technology alone were unable to solve the problems 
facing the economy. 
 
Regarding the petrochemical industry, the Government attempted to loosen political and 
economic constraints blocking the modernization of the industry. The new policies gave 
legitimacy to foreign participation, and led to a rapid development of financial, technical and 
economic ties with overseas suppliers. More outwards thrust was directed towards the 
international capital markets for large infrastructural projects. This was particularly the case 
of the capital-intensive petrochemical industry, which created requirements that were beyond 
the ability of the Government. While the practice in the past was to pay cash for large 
equipment purchases, the new commitment to modernization brought the realization that 
additional development assistance would be needed for large infrastructural projects. 
 
Table 2. Capital Investment in China’s Petrochemical Industry, 1978-1983 (billion Yen) 
 
  1978 1979 1980  1981 1982 1983 
      
Refining   0.5  0.5  0.6   0.5  0.4  0.5 
Chemical & Fertilizer  3.1  2.9  3.0   1.9  2.6  3.0 
 
Note: In 1983, 1 Yen = $0.5 
Source: China State Statistical Bureau 
 
Several sources of finance were explored. From the World Bank, China received over $500 
million (US dollars) to finance equipment purchases for oil-field surveys and petrochemical 
production modernization. Additional multilateral aid came from the United Nations 
Development Program. Bilateral aid was received from several countries, with Japan being 
the largest donor. Much of the foreign aid was channeled towards ‘soft’ assistance, including 
feasibility studies, technical advice, and consultants. Before the world oil prices collapsed in 
the early 1986, the Government committed itself through the Seventh Five-Year Plan to the 
figures of $300-500 million (US dollars) in software expenditures, and $50-100 million (US 
dollars) for refining and petrochemicals (Woodard, 1985). 
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Figure 2. China’s Plant and Technology Imports 
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 Source: adapted from Ono, S. (1992) World Bank Discussion Paper 
 
Other financial resources have also been mobilized. The Chinese Government floated Yen-
denominated bonds in the Tokyo market on behalf of the refining sector, and later on 
expanded to the Euro-currency market. Domestically, central allocation of investment funds 
had been reduced in favor of commercial bank loans. 
 
Although the links with foreign capital developed rapidly, China was more hesitant to adopt 
the Western accounting system. This was because the Government feared that the use of 
foreign financial analysis and foreign standards would ultimately change the way in which 
production decisions were made. The Government officials were also aware that the use of 
foreign accountancy management in purely domestic projects would remain somewhat 
limited as long as the pricing system remained unchanged. 
 
Foreign participation in China’s petrochemical industry provided impetus for a major re-
organisation of the management structure of the industry, resulting in the creation of giant 
centralised corporations to deal with foreign counterparts. The State Council established these 
new corporations to give foreign companies and investors a single entity to deal with. This 
eliminated partially the confusion arising from overlapping jurisdiction and responsibilities. 
As a result of this re-organisation the petrochemical and petroleum system was de-centralised 
and segmented, and responsibilities for the industry policy-making were distributed across 
several Ministries and Provinces.  
 
The aim of the re-organisation was in part to prevent from the development of multiple 
linkages between foreign companies and Ministerial or Provincial authorities, thereby 
strengthening the leverage at the center. In addition, the centralisation enabled the Central 
Government to wrest control of taxes and re-location of profits from the Ministries and 
Provinces to State Corporations.  
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In November 1984, an executive-level SINOPEC delegation toured the United States and 
visited most of the major oil companies and their most advanced refining units. In 1985, the 
US Department of Energy funded an exchange program with SINOPEC that began in late 
April with an executive-level conference at the East-West Center in Honolulu. These and 
other contacts have greatly raised the profile of US companies in China’s petrochemical 
construction market, traditionally preserved for Japanese and West European firms.4 All these 
new projects were just the beginning of what will be the substantial involvement of US-based 
companies in the modernization of China’s petrochemical industry.5  
 
Wishing to avoid the intrusion of arbitrary political decisions into business negotiations, 
foreign companies insisted that their interactions with Chinese counterparts be governed by 
routinised procedures and standardised contracts that are the international norm.  
 
The pressure for change has also been felt throughout the economy. Just as the lack of 
explicit legal procedures obstructed foreign participation in China, the absence of compatible 
standards for its economic output hindered trade. Problems developed in integrating imported 
petrochemical equipment with domestically built equipment based on Soviet design standards 
from the 1950s. Conversely, the petrochemical exports (a very small part of the Chinese 
exports) have suffered because of differences in domestic and international specifications. In 
response to that, China reformed rapidly its domestic standards, adopting 2,500 international 
standards by the end of 1980’s (China State Statistical Bureau). 
 
* Internationalisation During the 1990s 
 
The fundamental transformation during the 1990s was driven by the widespread adoption of 
foreign norms, practices and standards, and gave a new support to the reform of the industry. 
The financial, technical, and trade ties with the rest of the world, established by the state 
Corporations, provided channels for foreign influence. The initial steps towards 
internationalization were perceived as a way to supplement domestic capabilities. 
 
The internationalization of the Chinese petrochemical industry began initially through the 
establishment during the 1950s of SINOCHEM (responsible for the export of crude oil on 
behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFERT). The acquisition of foreign technology 
during the 1960s and 1970s established foreign partnerships, but it targeted mainly the 
development of the internal market. 
                                                          
4 During this short period the contracts or agreements with US-based companies include: 
• A 15 - year joint venture with Sun Oil to mix and package 50,000 tons of lubricating oil per year at a facility in 
Shenzhen 
• A $50 million contract with Kellogg to upgrade an ethylene facility in Gansu Province 
• A $25 to $30 million contract with Kellogg to build a coal gasification unit in Shanxi province for reducing gas at a 
steel mill  
• Purchase of 24 centrifugal pumps from Union Pump for $1 million 
• Process licenses with SOHIO (acrylonitrite), Union Carbide (low-density polyethylene), and Chemtex/American 
Cyanamid (acrylic fibers) 
• Purchase of refinery instrumentation (Provox System) from Fisher Controls through a Fisher joint venture in Shanghai 
• Purchase of a Spree 1100/72 process control computer for $1.72 million 
• A joint venture between Fluor and Sinopec’s Beijing Design Institute to design, engineer, construct and upgrade 
refinery and petrochemical plants. 
Three other letters of intent for joint ventures similar to the Fluor project with Bechtel, Kellogg, and C. F. Braun. 
5 Capital investment in China’s petrochemical industry averaged at 3 billion (US dollars) (US dollars) Renminbi per year 
between 1978 and 1983 (about 10% of total industrial investment). Investment in the refining sector added another 500 
million Renminbi to this figure, for a total investment in the petroleum downstream sector of 3.5 billion (US dollars) (US 
dollars) Renminbi per year. (China State Statistical Bureau)  
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The consolidation at home of SINOPEC operations during the 1980s gave the corporation a 
sound base for its move into the global arena. In 1991, exports of petrochemical products 
totaled about $1.42 billion (US dollars) in 1990 and $1 billion (US dollars) in 1991 which 
included $251 million (US dollars) worth of products exported directly by SINOPEC (Ono, 
1992). The value of imported technology and equipment for the same period was $750 
million (US dollars). Investment in petrochemical construction totaled $1.3 billion (US 
dollars, and $407 million (US dollars) was allocated for modernization projects. In 1991 the 
Corporation turned over $3.3 billion (US dollars) to the State, or about $270,000 more than 
the target (Ono, 1992).  
 
In 1992, China exported 100 kinds of petrochemical products, totaled at $1.5 billion (US 
dollars) (US dollars), including $254 million (US dollars) worth of products directly exported 
by SINOPEC. That was due to a change in Government policy, announced at the SINOPEC 
Annual Conference in 1992. The Government officials allowed SINOPEC International to 
control about one fifth of China’s petrochemical exports. SINOPEC International has offices 
in the US, Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Germany, and Ecuador, and has plans to enter the 
markets in Africa and South America with paraffin and petroleum coke. The fast growing 
market for petrochemical products in China has been the main attractive feature for a number 
of joint ventures with foreign partners, which has started to feed back into further 
modernization and internationalization of the industry. 
 
 A very important fact of the period since 1990 is that according to a number of fragmentary 
reports, there has been almost no significant foreign investment in the petrochemical industry, 
despite a great deal of publicity regarding prospective joint venture refineries to be built 
along China’s coastline. Official Chinese figures show that some $44 billion (US dollars) 
foreign funds were invested in China between 1979 and the middle of 1993 (World 
Investment Report, 1992). In fact, money from Hong Kong accounts for well over half of this 
investment, and the overseas Chinese are responsible for 80% of the total investment 
(Woden, 1993). 
 
4. State Intervention and Regulation  
 
The analysis of Government intervention and impact on the trade and the investment flow 
internationally has been isolated in the literature on International Trade and Trade Policies. 
The role of Government decisions and regulatory activities is a fairly neglected area. 
Regulatory policies, according to Dicken (1992), can be divided into two broad types: 
stimulatory policies (or those that aim to stimulate economic activity), and regulatory 
policies (or those that put constraints in the form of standards, requirements, and 
permissions).  
 
Stimulatory policies, according to Dicken, are those such as: fiscal or financial incentives 
offered by the Government to private firms (in the form of either capital grants/loans, or tax 
incentives); subsidies for labor, or training; state procurement; encouraging technological 
collaboration between firms through developing an information infrastructure and financial 
and technical support. In the list of regulatory policies Dicken includes: state ownership of 
production assets; mergers and competition policies; company legislation; labour regulation; 
and other elements of the legal framework (Dicken, 1992). 
 
These policies considerably overlap, and the boundaries between them are blurred, as each of 
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them may reinforce or counteract with the other. State industrial policies may be part of a 
national economic strategy, or may be individually implemented with a little co-ordination. 
There is a wide variety of practices within both developed and developing market economies. 
We will discuss the major types of industrial policies, that were implemented in China, and 
had an impact on the petrochemical industry.  
 
There are some descriptions in the literature of the complex system of state institutions in 
China, involved in the process of policy design and implementation (Kornaj, 1992, Child, 
1994, Todeva, 1998).  However, policy research has been obstructed not only by political 
factors, but also by fundamental methodological problems steaming from the delayed effects 
that is experienced by the socio-economic systems. We argue in this paper that the present 
condition of the petrochemical industry in China is a result of the accumulated effect from 
state intervention during the entire period after the Second World War. 
    
* China’s Petrochemical Planning System 
 
Since the petrochemical industry was founded, the firms in it remained almost exclusively 
state-owned. Despite the number of industry reforms, the Central Government still exercises 
a strong degree of control over the sector and a handful of quasi-governmental organisations 
oversee nearly every aspect of the business operations. The major players in the industry are 
presented in Figure. 3., and are grouped in two levels: the level of Central Government, and 
the Ministerial level. At the Ministerial level SINOPEC Corporation is presented as the 
dominant petrochemical producer and distributor. The decision powers of all agents are 
briefly described in the following sections. 
 
(a) Central Government Level 
 
The State Council, headed by the Premier, decides on the overall industrial strategies, on 
major investments, on certification of import quotas for petrochemicals, and for crude oil, and 
the approval of large projects. All joint ventures in the petrochemical industry typically 
surpass this level. 
 
The State Planning Commission (SPC) in China serves the same purpose as the Public Utility 
Commission in the US. It is the most powerful state economic agent in China, and is 
responsible for the formulation and carrying out of the National Economic Plan, for setting 
production targets for state industries and firms, for setting prices of products, for collecting 
taxes, and for approving of most of the large investment projects. This structure of 
responsibilities resembles very much what has been described for the centrally planed 
economies in Eastern Europe and Russia (Chavance, 1992, Kornaj, 1992, Todeva, 1998).  
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Figure 3. Administrative Structure of  the Petrochemical Planning and Production 
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The SPC in China is assisted in its tasks by the Provincial Planning Commissions, which report 
both to the SPC and to their Provincial Governor. The most important task that these Provincial 
Commissions perform is the collection of the taxes. 
 
The State Economic Commission (SEC) existed throughout most of the 1980s. Its task was to 
implement the plans, formulated by the SPC. It was concerned in the middle of the decade with 
the issues of technological improvement, management reform, and the national distribution of 
raw materials and energy (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1990). The SEC was dissolved in 1988 with 
many of its functions going to the SPC and to the new Ministry of Materials. 
 
In March 1993, the Economic and Trade Commission was established. It struggled to regain the 
powers previously held by SEC, but this time the task was focused on the conglomeration of 
state-owned enterprises; implementation of bankruptcy laws; reduction of stockpiles of goods; 
and improvement of the quality standards in the passenger airline industry. This did not influence 
the petrochemical industry directly, but indirectly it led to a boom in the petrochemicals-
consuming industries (e.g. the aircraft manufacturing and car industries), which extended the 
demand for petrochemicals at the domestic market. 
 
(b) The Ministerial Level 
 
The most important player at this level is SINOPEC (China Petrochemical Corporation), which 
dominates the production and the distribution in the industry. The State Council established 
SINOPEC in 1983 in order to consolidate the processing and distribution of petroleum products 
(Table 3.). The establishment of this ministry-level corporation was part of the overall reform of 
both the industrial economic sectors and the planning system. It enabled the Government to 
control the immense revenue stream generated by the refining industry, as well as to embark on a 
national program for refinery upgrade. SINOPEC also became the most important link between 
China’s petrochemical industry and the international markets. 
 
Table 3. SINOPEC - Capital Assets (in billion Renminbi) 
 
              1983   1984 
 
Registered Capital    21.8   21.8 
Gross Revenues    25.0   27.4 
Profit      9.9   11.5 
Employees (thousand)   480   500 
 
Note: in 1984,  1 Renminbi = $0.43 
Source: SINOPEC Annual Report, 1992, 1993 
 
SINOPEC, as a dominant organisation in the Chinese petrochemical industry, controls more than 
70 subsidiaries and processes about 90% of China’s crude oil, gas, and petrochemical products. 
This includes 38 refineries, 21 basic organic chemical facilities, 15 synthetic fiber facilities, five 
synthetic rubber plants, three synthetic resin plants, 13 chemical fertilizer facilities, five 
construction companies, seven research and design institutes, and six trade and sales 
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organisations (see Table 4.). The overall value of SINOPEC fixed assets is at $15 billion (US 
dollars). 
 
Table 4. Production Facilities Under SINOPEC in 1983 
Enterprise       Former Administration 
1. Yanshan Petrochemical Co. MOCI 
2. Tianjin Petrochemical Co. MOT, MOPI 
3. Shanghai General Petrochemical Works. MOT 
4. Shanghai Gaoqiao Petrochemical Co. MOPI, MOCI 
5. Yangzi Petrochemical Co. MOCI 
6. Jilin Petrochemical Co. MOLI, MOPI, MOCI 
7. Fushun Petrochemical Co. MOPI 
8. Jinzhou Petrochemical Co. MOPI 
9. Shandong Qilu Petrochemical Co. MOCI 
10. Lanzhou Chemical Industry Co. MOCI 
11. Maoming Petrochemical Industry Co. MOPI 
12. Daqing General Petrochemical Works MOPI 
13. Anqing General Petrochemical Works MOCI 
14. Guangzhou General Petrochemical Works MOCI 
15. Liaoyang Petrochemical Fiber Co.  MOT 
16. Sichuan Vinylon Plant MOT 
17. Dalian Petrochemical  Co. MOPI 
18. Anshan Refinery MOMI 
19. Linyuan Refinery MOA 
20. Harbin Refinery Heilongjiang Province 
21. Lanzhou Refinery MOPI 
22. Dushanzi Refinery MOPI 
23. Urumqi General Petrochemical Works MOPI 
24. Cangzhou Refinery Heibei Province 
25. Jinan Refinery Shandong Province 
26. Changling Refinery MOPI 
27. Zhenhai General Petrochemical Works MOPI 
28. Jingmen Refinery MOPI 
29. Wuhan Petrochemical Works MOPI 
30. Jiujiang refinery MOPI 
31. Shijiazhuang Refinery MOPI 
32. Luoyang Refinery MOPI 
33. Yueyang General Petrochemical Works MOCI 
34. Dongting Nitrogenous Fertilizer Plant MOCI 
35. Zhijiang Chemical Fertilizer Plant MOCI 
36. Ningxia Chemical Fertilizer Plant  -- 
37. Qianguo Refinery -- 
38. Yiping Chemical Plant -- 
39. Daqing Ethylene Construction Headquarters -- 
 
Key to Abbreviations: 
MOA Ministry of Agriculture  
MOCI Ministry of Chemical Industry 
MOLI Ministry of Light Industry 
MOMI Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 
MOPI Ministry of Petroleum Industry 
MOT Ministry of Textiles 
 
Source: SINOPEC Annual Report, 1992 
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SINOPEC was established as directly accountable to the State Council and the State Planning 
Commission, rather than to other Ministries. The rationale for the setting up of such a 
Corporation included the following objectives: (1) to reduce the competition for key resources 
and products by bureaucratic ministries; (2) to integrate vertically and horizontally the related 
industries throughout China; and (3) to increase the importance of financial and economic 
considerations in management decisions. 
 
Although ministry-level corporations have been nominally separated from the Ministries, 
virtually all of their staff has been transferred from the relevant departments of the Ministries (in 
many cases their offices were still within the same buildings). SINOPEC’s leadership has been 
taken almost exclusively from the Ministry of Petroleum Industry and the Ministry of Chemical 
Industry. 
 
Prior to the establishment of SINOPEC, several different Ministries - assigned largely according 
to the final use of the products (see Table 4.) administered petrochemical processing. In fact, 
they were closely attached either to individual oil-field administrations (such as Daqing, Shengli, 
etc.), or to large municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, etc.), which led to 
underutilisation of many of the by-products. 
 
Table 4. presents 39 of China’s largest petroleum downstream facilities that were placed under 
the control of SINOPEC. The Corporation was effectively given the control of about 95% of 
China’s petroleum refining capacity. The remaining refineries (mainly small capacity units, 
located near small oil fields) were left under the administration of the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry. With this restructuring in 1983, SINOPEC was also given the jurisdiction over the 
production of about 85% of China’s ethylene, 80% of synthetic fiber monomers, 75% of 
synthetic rubber, and over 40% of synthetic fiber and plastics. The concern therefore was not 
with the competitiveness and efficiency of the production units, but with streamlining 
coordination and control, and achieving economies of scale.  
 
The China Chemical Import and Export Corporation (SINOCHEM) is the company responsible 
for marketing crude oil and petroleum products internationally since 1950’s. The firm is an arm 
of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). SINOCHEM has been 
channeling foreign exchange earnings from crude oil through MOFERT directly into the Central 
Budget under the control of the State Council. SINOPEC was not given access to this revenue 
stream, but was allowed to compete for its share of the potential foreign exchange. This change 
made the refining sector a key profit center in China’s petrochemical industry. However, the 
competition in crude oil export was undermined by the dual price structure of crude oil and its 
products.  
 
The China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) is China’s major producer of crude oil, accounting 
for 97% of the country’s crude oil output in 1992. It controls all onshore fields and shallow-
water offshore fields up to 5m deep. The CNPC was formed when the former Ministry of 
Petroleum was dissolved in 1988 - an action that intended to streamline bureaucracy and to 
rationalise oil production operations.  
 
The contracting agent for CNPC in its cooperation with foreign companies is China National Oil 
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and Gas Development Corp. (CNODC), which is a wholly owned subsidiary of CNPC. CNPC 
still serves as the major policy adviser to the State Council on oil and gas issues. Much of its 
output is sold at below-market prices to state enterprises, and state planners have a direct say in 
how the company operates. Most of oil producers within CNPC turn over their profits to the 
State, in return for direct investment from the Central Government. 
 
The China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) was formed in 1982 to control all offshore oil 
and gas fields in water more than 5 m deep. The Company was organised to act as a state 
representative in joint projects with foreign companies related to the development of China’s 
offshore oil and gas reserves. CNOOC is more commercial than CNPC, and is in a far better 
financial position. This is due mainly to the fact that foreign exploration contracts account for 
nearly 40% of CNOOC’s long-term investments, and much of its production is exported. 
 
China International United Petroleum and Chemical Corp. (UNIPEC) is a 50-50% joint venture 
between SINOPEC and SINOCHEM, which was formed in February 1993. UNIPEC is 
authorised to import both petroleum products and crude oils for SINOPEC’s refineries. 
 
5. Analysis of the Impact of Government Regulation Policy on the 
Petrochemical Industry  
 
In the early period after the Second World War, China adopted the Soviet model of central 
planning to promote economic development. Since the introduction of the ‘Open Door’ policy 
during the 1980s, the most important change has been a gradual reduction of the role of the 
Central Planning System. The share of the investments, controlled by the State Planning 
Commission and financed through the budget, have declined dramatically. 
 
However, most of the developments in the petrochemical industry correspond to a series of Five-
Year Plans promulgated by the Government planners. The formation of SINOPEC in 1983 
coincided with the rapid acceleration of investment in domestic petrochemicals. Total growth in 
domestic petrochemical investment averaged 15.4% per year during the Sixth Five-Year Plan 
(1981-1985). This growth was slowed down to 10% per year during the Seventh Five-Year Plan 
(1986-1990), but still remained ahead of China’s general economic and industrial growth rates 
(China’s Chemical Information Centre). Overall, the pattern of the domestic investment shows 
that during the Sixth Five Year Plan China invested a relatively large amount of capital with 
relative small returns (Vergara & Babelon, 1990). Part of this was due to long construction lead-
times. However, the small return on investment raised the fundamental question of efficiency. 
Meanwhile as the export of crude oil decreased during this period, the industry did not have the 
sufficient financial resources. 
 
By 1990, the petrochemical industry experienced an explosive, demand-driven expansion of 
capacity6, fed by carefully allocated capital investment in new constructions. The Eighth Five-
Year Plan (1990-2000) stipulated that at least 18 new major projects would need to be financed 
within the SINOPEC Corporation, or via joint ventures. The Government’s Ninth Five-Year Plan 
                                                          
6 Because of long construction lead-time, the momentum generated by the rapid increase of investment during the 
1981-1985 period had carried over to a major expansion of capacity in basic petrochemicals, synthetic rubber, 
plastics, and synthetic fiber during the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). 
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(1996-2000), projected the construction of 14 new plants and numerous downstream factories in 
order to increase the production capacity. Even with these aggressive plans, the supply of plastic 
and fiber materials still cannot satisfy the local demand. A Japanese consultancy report predicts 
that China will continue to experience impressive double-digit growth in demand for commodity 
resins (Martech Inc., 1995, Tokyo). 
 
In this context of continuous expansion of the petrochemical industry, a number of changes in 
the planning system were introduced. Broadly speaking, the role of mandatory planning through 
production quotas, and the use of the material supply system for the allocation of inputs to 
enterprises to meet these quotas, was drastically reduced in the 1990’s. The system of mandatory 
planning has slowly given way to the use of a new form of indicative planning via the use of 
direct contracts with enterprises to meet industrial output targets.  
 
The number of key materials allocated to firms through the Central Material Supply System 
(CMSS) was also gradually reduced. The bulk of the investments in the 90’s was financed 
through bank loans or retained earnings by the firms. Investment approvals were still required, 
but approval limits have been withdrawn, and investment decisions have been decentralised. The 
decentralisation of investment decisions from the State Planning Commission to the ministerial-
level corporations and Provincial Governments has meant a loss of central control over both the 
level and the type of investments being made.  
 
The Government control is still exercised through price controls and through intervention in the 
distribution system. Although recent economic reforms have introduced more individual 
incentives and a greater use of markets, China’s economy is still characterised by a strict vertical 
control, and relatively few horizontal linkages, and most of the industrial goods still fall under 
the jurisdiction of the State Materials Supply Bureau (Singh, 1992). The crude oil, as one of the 
key materials, is still subject to Government’s tight control. 
 
At present, the distribution system for crude oil is controlled by the Government through 
allocating product quotas to firms at fixed prices. The authority to distribute refined products was 
solely given to SINOPEC, thereby prohibiting any reselling of products7. Relying on such a 
structure for state allocation of crude oil resources, the Government intends to create a stable, 
vertical, hierarchical marketing and distributing system. This integration is expected to reduce 
the geographical unbalance in the supply and demand of petrochemicals. SINOPEC has been 
authorised to control all the production of crude oil according to the Government’s allocation 
instructions. However, in reality its failure to control and distribute all the products has exposed 
its inefficiency.  
 
An example of it is the fact that in 1992 Daqing Petrochemical Corporation (one of the biggest 
and earliest oil refineries) was forced to reduce its output, because SINOPEC was not able to 
                                                          
7 In order to avoid limitations and conflicts between Local Governments, in 1983 the Central Government divided 
SINOPEC’s distribution system into six provincial level subsidiaries to cover all the provinces. These subsidiaries 
were expected to facilitate the adjustment of the local supply and demand balance by reallocating resources. This 
added one more administrative layer to the distribution system. Unfortunately, these subsidiaries had the authority 
only to sell crude oil allocated by their parent company - SINOPEC - and had no access to any other sources of 
supply. Principal products could be imported only by a licensed company, and only three companies – SINOPEC, 
China Oil, and UNIPEC – were granted licenses. 
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allocate and distribute the produced crude oil8.  
 
The industry reports also point out that despite the shortage for petrochemical products, Chinese 
plants are running at an extremely low capacity-utilisation rate. In addition, local resins 
apparently can’t compete in terms of quality with imported resins, especially from Japan and 
Taiwan, and are thus not favored by processors and their customers (UNIDO, 1991). 
 
The tension within the SINOPEC’s allocation and distribution system, derives also from the 
competition that is allowed between its provincial subsidiaries. Some of the subsidiaries are able 
to get more crude oil quotas from the SINOPEC’s Headquarters, and to sell the excess of 
‘planned’ crude oil at subsidised prices to some enterprises in other provincial areas. The result 
of this combination of planned allocation and competition is a distribution system, which is 
neither capable to stimulate growth of the supply of crude oil, nor capable to satisfy the demand 
for it. 
 
The inflexibility in the crude oil allocation not only blocks product flow between regions, and 
also crude oil flow among refineries. The southern refineries could not receive adequate crude 
supplies allocated by the Central Government, while surplus products stockpiled in the north 
could not be shipped to the south because of a transportation bottleneck (UNIDO, 1991). The 
losses by the state-owned enterprises have amounted to as much as 5% of China’s gross 
domestic product (The Economist, 1994). 
 
SINOPEC’s administrative distribution system has integrated vertically supply and demand lines, 
and at the same time it has absorbed all the conflicts in the supply chain for crude oil. The entire 
system involves considerable bargaining between various organisations, and this leads to 
significant differences between various administrative areas of the country. This is a result of the 
relative economic and political strengths of various regions, enterprises, and individuals. The 
enterprises’ individual role in the entire system can be downplayed by the Government 
intervention. 
 
6. The Contradictory Effects of the Price Reform in 1993: 
 
Pricing policies during 60’s, 70’s and 80’s created the largest distortions, with low-value 
products - subsidised by high-value ones, and underpriced crude oil - subsidised by overpriced 
products. Refineries were forced to provide quota amounts of the subsidised fuel to the state 
firms to meet local needs. High-cost oil-fields were often subsidised by an oil-field refinery. 
Innovation was discouraged through a lack of price incentives and personal decision-making 
power. Politics remained in command, and in many instances guided both the choice of imports, 
and their disposition (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1980). 
 
A report, commissioned by the World Bank concludes that the most persistent problems in China 
are caused by the dual pricing system that exists for state planned and market goods (Singh, 
1992). This system, according to Singh, creates distortions in the allocation of resources away 
from their best usage (by fixed price), and encourages the development of corruption and rental 
                                                          
8 Daqing is the largest oil-field in China. It opened in 1960 in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang province. 
Produce nearly half of national production of crude oil. Output growth levelled off in recent years. 
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payments (through the gap between the high and low prices). The system has particularly serious 
negative consequences for the long-term industrial development, especially since the 
Government’s ability to correct these distortions has been reduced because of the 
decentralisation and the declining revenues (Singh, 1992). 
 
Under such an oil policy, the China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) has been losing as much 
as Renminbi 6 billion (US dollars) (US dollars) a year since its inception in 1985 (CNPC Annual 
Report, 1992). Besides the drain on the state coffers, these loses have squeezed the money 
available for oil exploration and even for maximising output from existing fields. As a result of 
that, onshore crude oil production has been stagnated since 1985, even though the consumption 
of refined oil products has grown by 7% a year.  
 
After the 14th Party Congress an ambitious plan to bring the crude oil price more into line with 
international rates was launched. As a result of the price reform, a barrel of crude oil in China 
costs about $1 per barrel more than on the international markets. Transport bottlenecks were also 
responsible for pushing up the price.  
 
The economic impact of raising crude oil prices was mixed. CNPC became profitable virtually 
overnight. This, together with the release of control of the distribution of crude oil made 1993 the 
year of great oil market freedom. During the same year, the crude oil distribution faced an 
increased demand from the fast growing domestic market. It boosted the crude oil trade flow 
domestically. This increase resulted in the establishment of three separate petroleum exchanges, 
and as a result of that the private petroleum retailing mushroomed. However this also created 
chaos on the market because of the weaknesses in the legal system. Inflation soared in 1993, in 
part, as a result of the liberalised crude oil prices. In 1994, the Government decided to re-
establish its control over the crude oil market. During the same period of turmoil on the market 
some state-owned enterprises came under more pressure to cope with the higher prices. The 
biggest looser was SINOPEC as the largest refinery in China. SINOPEC was a main beneficiary 
of a system in the past that ensured artificially low crude oil prices and relatively high prices for 
refined products. In the short term, the overhaul of crude oil prices shifted subsidies within the 
economy from SINOPEC to CNPC.  
 
The reform of the crude oil price in 1993 exposed numerous SINOPEC problems, which were 
ignored by the company previously because of its monopolistic position and its large profits in 
the past. One of these major problems was that SINOPEC was saddled with far too many 
refineries, and most of them were too small to be economically efficient. The uneconomic basic 
structure exposed SINOPEC as having a lack of competitiveness in a free market environment. 
 
In terms of plant-utilisation rates, most of SINOPEC’s facilities use only 50-75% of their rated 
capacity. Anything less than 80% is generally regarded as unprofitable in the global 
petrochemical industry. Staffing levels also run three to four times higher than the international 
standard (SINOPEC Annual Report, 1994).  
 
7. Conclusions:  
 
The inefficiency of SINOPEC is an example of the effect of government regulation policies that 
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enhances market distortions, and allows large players to exist comfortably on subsidized prices 
and preferential allocation of resources and control functions. SINOPEC’s misfortunes illustrated 
also the broader problems facing China’s economy. The efforts of policy makers to untangle 
irrational price regimes had intensified contradictions between the Central Government and the 
Provinces, the producers and the consumers. Sharp operators were also reaping windfall profits 
by exploiting regional price differentials. It has been argued that this sort of phenomenon results 
from taking reforms half way and then stopping them. There are also views that China is a 
unique case and has to find its own way to modernization (Warner, 1998) 
 
The political intervention on the market for petrochemicals in China have undergone through 
various evolutionary stages. In 1981, the Central Government advocated that the mandatory 
planning stands first, while the market economy is second. In October 1984, the socialist 
commodity market was established, and in October 1987, the political thinking evolved to a 
point advocating that the state guides the market, and in turn the market guides enterprises.  
 
Somewhat later in 1991, the combination of the state planning and market force was accepted. 
The fact that both the planning and the market are means of co-ordination of the economic 
development was first recognised in 1992, and the program to establish a socialist market 
economy was officially announced at the 14th Party Congress. 
 
The main vehicles for change are: less intensive protection by the Government, attracting more 
foreign investment; lowering or removal of the non-tariff trade barriers; and intensifying the 
competitions from TNCs. A greater internationalisation is the aim of both the Government and 
the industry leaders. 
 
The opening to international competition in the 80’s transformed both the administrative 
structure and the management practices in the petrochemical industry. Equipment and 
construction became financed through loans rather than relying on the exports of crude oil. The 
soft assistance in the form of feasibility studies and training became as valuable as hardware 
purchases. Projects were emphasised over quantitative targets. The importation of advanced 
technology moved the industry towards national integration in order to facilitate diffusion. 
Operational equipment became subject to the requirements set by international standards. A new 
legal infrastructure was created to govern the transactions with foreign companies. The authority 
over the petrochemical production was wrested away from the several Ministries, and was 
concentrated in SINOPEC. However, the strict regulations on labor and technology transfer 
forced some foreign companies during the 80’s to pull out of China. In addition to that, the most 
promising big petrochemical complexes remained close to foreign operators.  
 
All these facts lead to the conclusion that while the government intervention has a positive effect 
on building capacity, it has a clearly negative impact on efficient use of resources. The 
centralisation of decision making power leads to fundamental distortions on the market. The 
entrenched interests of corporate leaders affect further decision making, resource allocation, and 
raise barriers to innovation and competition. The idea of a socialist market after all is only a 
political objective, and there are no clear evidence yet in what way it may become a reality in 
China. 
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